Office2pdf security

• Xvnc is started using the -localhost option. This prevents anybody from outside to connect to office2pdf's vnc session via the RFB protocol, and taking control of it. If such behavior is not wanted (because you want to debug office2pdf from another machine), you can remove the -localhost flag from office2pdf.cfg. Alternatively, you can set up a tunnel via ssh, and then connect your vnc to localhost:99

  
     ssh -L 5999:localhost:5999 office2pdfhost
   

• Xvnc is started using the -nolisten tcp option. This prevents anybody from outside to connect to office2pdf's session via the X protocol.
• A Vnc password protects access to VNC, even in the case of untrusted users having access to the machine where office2pdf is running on. You may also use the Xvfb server rather than Xvnc (just comment the lines about Xvnc in the office2pdf.cfg file, and uncomment the lines about Xvfb (xPrepare, xserver).
• The installation procedure recommends removing any wine drives except C: and X: (/tmp). This should prevent any virus-infected Word file from messing up with the Unix installation. As it is now, a virus could only mess up office2pdf itself, but not take control over the whole system.
• The installation procedure recommends installing office2pdf under its own user (offi2pdf). Again, this contributes to limit any potential damage to just that user, rather than exposing the whole machine.
• The unpacker.pl checks for X-Loop and MAILER-DAEMON headers in order to avoid that pranksters trick office2pdf into a loop.
• No protection against spammers is implemented; however due to the program's slowness (it can take a minute or more to process a file), it is utterly uninteresting for spammers anyways. However, just in case, the headers of the original mail are included in the reply, as an attachment.